Abstract. In 2013, Borghoff et al. introduced a slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like ciphers with key-dependent secret S-boxes. In this paper, we propose an improved slender-set linear attack to PRESENTlike ciphers with secret S-boxes. We investigate three new cryptanalytic techniques, and use them to recover the secret S-boxes efficiently. Our first new idea is that we propose a new technique to support consistency of partitions of the input to the secret S-boxes. Our second new technique is that we present a more efficient method to recover the coordinate functions of secret S-boxes based on more information than that of Borghoff's attack. The third new technique is that we propose a method of constructing all correct coordinate function of secret S-boxes by pruning search algorithm. In particular, we implemented a successful linear attack on the full round Maya in practice. In our experiments, the correct S-box can be recovered with 2 36 known plaintexts, 2 18.9 time complexity and negligible memory complexity at a success rate of 87.5%. Our attack is the improvement and sequel of Borghoff's work on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes.
Introduction
Block ciphers are a class of cryptographic algorithms which are widely used. After the establishment of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), there has been a need for cryptographic solutions which can provide low cost security for small device, such as RFID tags or sensor networks. This opens up the study field of lightweight block cipher.
In recent years, many lightweight block ciphers have been developed, such as mCrypton [14] , HIGHT [11] , SEA [20] , DESXL [13] , KATAN [8] , MIBS [12] . PRESENT [3] is the most remarkable representative lightweight block cipher. It is proposed by Bogdanov et al. in CHES 2007 . PRESENT cipher is an iterated 31 rounds SPN block cipher with a 64-bit block size. PRESENT has two variants of key, one with an 80-bit and the other with a 128-bit. Each round of PRESENT cipher has three layers. The first layer is a substitution layer, which consists of 16 parallel applications of the same 4-bit S-box. The second layer is a permutation layer, which consists of a bit-wise permutation of 64-bit. The last layer is a key addition layer, where a round key is exclusive-ored to the text. Due to the small 4-bit S-box, bit-wise permutation and Xor addition, PRESENT has a fast and compact hardware implementation. In recent years, the cryptanalysis on PRESENT has been actively performed so far. The best known cryptanalysis attack on PRESENT is a linear attack on 26 of the 31 rounds presented by Cho [9] in CT-RSA 2010. This attack could break the 26 rounds PRESENT with 2 64 data complexity, 2 32 memory accesses complexity and 2 72 time complexity. Although this attack is hardly to perform in practice, the number of rounds used should not be dramatically reduced.
In order to strengthen the PRESENT cipher and reduce the number of rounds, Gomathisankaran and Lee [15] presented a PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes which is named Maya. The Maya cipher is a 16 rounds SPN cipher similar to PRESENT. The difference between PRESENT and Maya is that the substitution layer of Maya consists of 16 different S-boxes which are key-dependent and unknown.
Linear cryptanalysis [16, 17] is a classical tool for analyzing block ciphers. It was introduced by Matsui in 1993. Since for a random permutation, the probability of any linear relation between the plaintext and corresponding ciphertext bits should be balanced at 1/2 which is not always the same in the case of block ciphers. In linear cryptanalysis, the attacker tries to find biased linear approximations for non-linear components of a cipher and then use them to find biased linear approximations for the entire cipher. It can be used as a distinguisher, by which a key-recovery attack can be achieved.
Nowadays, there are only a few papers investigating the security of PRESENTlike cipher with secret S-boxes. In 2011, Borghoff et al. [6] proposed a slender-set differential cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like cipher with randomly chosen secret S-boxes. In 2013, Borghoff et al. [7] outline how to attack this type of cipher with a linear attack by using slender-set. However, the slender-set linear cryptanalysis proposed in [7] was simply described and has something to be improved. In this paper, we present an improved slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like cipher. Our Results In this paper, we investigate an improved slender-set linear cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes. Our contributions are threefold. First, we present a new technique to support consistency of partitions of the input to the secret S-box of the first S-box layer. This modification makes it possible to transform the original vectors into binary vectors more reasonably. Our second new idea is that we propose a new method to get the coordinate functions of secret S-boxes efficiently based on more information. This method considers all the information that comes from the candidate coordinate functions together instead of the three longest candidate coordinate functions. The third new technique is that we present a method of constructing the correct coordinate functions by pruning search algorithm, which can help us to recover the secret S-boxes more efficiently. Finally, we focus on the settings of PRESENTlike cipher where the secret S-boxes are key-dependent and are repeated for the first and last rounds. We propose an effective method of determining the correct S-box from the equivalent S-boxes with low time complexity. In particular, we implemented an improved slender-set linear attack to the full round Maya successfully. In our experiments, the correct S-box can be recovered with 2 36 data complexity, 2 18.9 time complexity and negligible memory complexity at a success rate of 87.5%. The correct S-box is usually found in less than a few minutes on a standard PC. Our attack is the improvement and sequel of Borghoff's work on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes. Related Work There are lots of design and analysis to ciphers with secret Sboxes. In 1994, Gilbert and Chauvaud [10] presented a differential attack on the cipher Khufu which used secret S-boxes. Biham and Biryukov [1] described methods of strengthening DES, without slowing encryption speed, in which keydependency is added by simply XORing key material before and after the Sboxes calculation. They studied the strengthened version of DES against exhaustive search, differential, and linear attacks that can be used existing hardware. In 1996, Vaudenay [23] provided a cryptanalysis of reduced-round variants of Blowfish, in which the S-boxes were randomly generated from the private key. In 1998, Schneier and Kelsey et al. [19] studied a new encryption algorithm with key-dependent S-boxes. In 2001, Biryukov and Shamir [2, 3] investigated the security of iterated ciphers, in which the substitutions and permutations are all secret and key-dependent. In 2009, Borghoff et al. [5] researched on the cipher C2, which has a secret S-box. In 2011, Szaban and Seredynski [22] proposed cryptanalysis of a methodology to design dynamic cellular automata (CA)-based S-boxes. Stoianov [21] presented and analyzed an approach to change the S-boxes used in the algorithm AES. In 2013, Peng and Jin [18] proposed a cryptanalysis of a new method to design key-dependent S-boxes by using hyperchaotic Chen system. Organization The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the structure of PRESENT-like cipher. Section 3 outlines the slender-set linear attack on PRESENT-like cipher described in [7] . Section 4 presents our improved slenderset linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes. Section 5 gives experimental results of our attack on Maya cipher. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
The PRESENT-like Cipher
The PRESENT-like cipher is an n-bit SPN block cipher. The round function consists of round key, S-boxes and permutations. Assuming that the number of rounds is N .
(1) Round key K: n-bit round key is Xored to the text. (2) S-box S: n/m key dependent and different m-bit secret S-boxes. (3) P-box P: The bit-wise permutation between the S-box layers is public or secret.
The PRESENT-like cipher can be described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 N -rounds PRESENT-like cipher
Require: n-bit plaintext; main key K Ensure:
n-bit ciphertext C = EK (X) 1: Derive n/m m-bit S-boxes Si and round keys Ki (
for j = 1 to n/m do 6:
Apply bit permutation to ST AT E 8:
Add round key Ki to ST AT E 9:
end for 10: end for 11: return Maya is a typical example of the PRESENT-like cipher described in Algorithm 1 with n = 64 and m = 4
Borghoff 's Slender-set Linear Attack
In this section, we review the Borghoff's slender-set linear attack of recovering the secret S-boxes described in [7] . We call the attack in [7] as Borghoff 's linear attack for short. First, we introduce some notations and definitions used in this paper.
Linear Cryptanalysis
We follow the notations used in [7] . The canonical inner product on F n 2 is denoted by ·, · , that is
, for an m -bit output mask β and an n-bit input mask α , the bias ε of the linear approximation β, H(x) + α, x is defined by
where the probability p is taken over all choices of inputs x. The Walsh or Fourier-transform of H at the pair (α,
The relation between the Fourier transform of H and the bias of a linear approximation is given by ε =Ĥ (α, β) 2 n+1 Thus to study the bias β, H(x) + α, x is equivalent to study the Fouriertransform of H at the pair (α, β).
Brief Description of Borghoff 's Linear Attack
In this section, we introduce the basic principle of Borghoff's linear Attack. In [7] , Borghoff et al. started with a differential-style attack on PRESENT-like cipher. They supposed that the characteristics with single-bit differences at the output of the S-box layer in the first round have a stronger correlation with single-bit differences at the input to the S-box layer in the last round. They named this differential attack as the slender-set differential cryptanalysis. Using a similar hypothesis for linear characteristics, they could get useful information about the secret S-boxes with the single-bit mask at the output of the S-box layer in the first round and the low-weight mask at the input of the S-box layer in the last round. Thus we can name this linear attack as slender-set linear cryptanalysis. In the following, we outline Borghoff's linear attack.
Without loss of generality, Borghoff's linear attack focused on the leftmost Sbox, which is denoted simply by S . All other S-boxes can be processed similarly. We denote that
and F (x, y) = c where the function F is the encryption function that starts after the first layer of S-boxes, x is the output of the leftmost S-box of the first S-box layer, and y is concatenation of the outputs of the remaining S-boxes of the first S-box layer. Thus the Fourier-transform of F at the pair (( and T x (y) = F (x, y) and we look atT
We list two useful lemmas in [7] as follows.
Lemma 1 [7] With the notation from above, it holds that
Denote the whole encryption function by E. They split its input as before and consider
and E(x, y) = c where x is now the input to the first S-box, and y is the input to all other S-boxes. They define the function corresponding to fixing x as T x , that is
and
For a selection of masks β and each possible value of x , they estimate the value of T x (0, β) . This is simply done by encrypting a number of known plaintexts with the first four bits fixed to x and counting how often the value of
is zero (resp., one). The next lemma is the key for deducing information about the secret S-box.
Lemma 2 [7] With the notation from above, the bias of β, T x (y) is equal to the bias of β, T S(x) (y) . That iŝ
In [7] , they assume that, for a given mask β , there is exactly one mask α such thatF ((α, 0), β) is high while for any ξ = α the valueF ((ξ, 0), β) is close to zero. According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we havê
In this way, we can partition the values of x into two equally-sized sets V 0 and V 1 depending on the sign ofT x (0, β) , where
If we get all four linearly independent coordinate functions of secret S-box, such as (
we can recover the secret S-box. Borghoff's linear attack is summarized as the following steps:
Step1. Let the output mask β = 0 4j ||b||0 60−4j , 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. For every leftmost input 0 ≤ x ≤ 15 and for every 1 ≤ b ≤ 15, we estimate the value of the counterT x (0, β) by Eq. (1) after encrypting enough plaintexts.
Step2. After 15 vectors
being retrieved, we identify the three longest vectors using the Euclidean norm as a metric, as Borghoff et al. assume that these vectors contain the most reliable information. We transform each of these vectors into a binary vector such that the eight highest counter values correspond to '1'-bits and the remaining correspond to '0'-bits.
Step3. We take a majority vote among these three binary vectors to find the correct coordinate functions of secret S-box.
Step4. We recover the 4-bit secret S-boxes based on four linearly independent coordinate functions of secret S-boxes.
Through the above steps, we may partition the value of x into two sets V γ = {x| α, S(x) = γ}, γ = 0, 1 . However, the value of α and γ are unknown. Borghoff et al. pointed out that they might reveal one or more of the sets {x| 2 i , S(x) = 0}, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 by repeating the steps described above for other value of β = 0 4j ||b||0 60−4j with different 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. However, the linear cryptanalysis proposed in [7] was in less details and has something to be improved.
First, according to Eq. (1), we can only partition the value of x into two sets V γ = {x| α, S(x) = γ}, γ = 0, 1 by Borghoff's linear attack. However, for a fixed α , the value of γ is unknown, which would cause problems: for a fixed α, we can only know which values of x belong to the same set, but we still do not know the values of x belong to which set. In other words, if one coordinate of the binary vector is equal to "0", it dose not mean the corresponding value of coordinate function is essentially equal to "0". Furthermore, the sign ofF ((α, 0), β) might be opposite for the same α and the different β. According to Eq. (1), the opposite sign ofF ((α, 0), β) will cause opposite sign ofT x (0, β). This makes it possible to partition the x into different set with the same α and the different β. We did the same work as Borghoff et al. did. As an example, we carried out this attack using 2 25 known plaintexts on the 10 rounds PRESENT-like cipher. The three longest vectors were these: We can see that the partition of x in the third binary vector is opposite comparing with that in the first and second binary vectors. This problem will bring some noise when we recover the correct coordinate functions of secret S-box with majority vote. To overcome this, we develop a new idea to support consistency of the partition of x.
Second, due to that Borghoff et al. just used the information from the three longest vectors, which will lose the information from the candidate binary vectors. Furthermore, the majority vote for getting "true" vector in [7] is not reasonable and to be perfected. In order to improve the information collection phase, we present a new method of making full use of information from the 240 output low-weight masks β = 0 4j ||b||0 60−4j , 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, 1 ≤ b ≤ 15 of the S-box layer in the last round instead of three longest vectors. And we introduce an improved voting method for constructing the correct candidate coordinate functions.
Third, for PRESENT-like cipher, the experiment shows that we can only get one correct set {x| 2 i , S(x) = 0}, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 in most case by using Borghoff's linear attack. As an example, we carried out Borghoff's attack by using 2 22 to 2 27 known plaintexts on the 10 rounds PRESENT-like cipher. However, we can only get one or two correct coordinate functions of secret S-box(see Table 3 ). This makes it possible to recover 1 or 2 out of 4 bit information of secret S-box in most case, but not the 4-bit information about secret S-box. The question is: How to get more correct coordinate functions of secret S-box as many as possible with lower data complexity? To overcome this problem, we proposed method of constructing all correct coordinate functions of secret S-box by using pruning search algorithm.
Improved Slender-set Linear Cryptanalysis
In this section, we explain the approach of our improved slender-set linear cryptanalysis of recovering the secret S-box. Comparing with the Borghoff's linear attack, there are three main improvements in this paper. First, we present a new technique to avoid the complementary vectors in the candidate coordinate functions of secret S-boxes. Second, we propose an efficiently method of getting full use of all the information coming from the active S-box synthetically. In other words, we consider all the 15 × 16 = 240 vectors together instead of the three longest vectors. Third, we introduce an effective filter to construct correct coordinate functions of secret S-boxes by using pruning search algorithm. The pruning search algorithm can help us to search the correct coordinate functions as many as possible with lower complexity. Finally, we focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key-dependent and are repeated for the first and last rounds. We investigate an efficient method of recovering the secret S-box uniquely with a low time complexity. 
Recovering the Correct Coordinate Functions
We 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)   (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)   (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) The benefit of this technique is that the value of the first coordinate of binary vector B i is identically equal to "0". By using this method, we can support consistency of the partition of input x based on the original vector
After we get the 240 binary vectors B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 240 , we introduce the second technique of our improved attack as follows.
We 
where k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.
We now compute the probability distribution of wt(α ⊕ β) for two vectors α, β based on the notation in Lemma 3 (see Table 1 ). Now we explain our approach for getting the information about secret S-box from all 240 binary vectors B β . We assume that the binary vectors corresponding the same α are similar to each other. We start with the method of partition B β by using the notion of similarity degree as following definition. 
where the function g(
According to Definition 1, the similarity degree of B i and B j considers not only the relationship between B i and B j but also the relationship from other B k , which can help us to collect all the correlation between 240 candidate binary vectors synthetically with suitable value of t, ξ, τ . Fig 1 shows the form of similarity degree: In order to recover four coordinate functions of secret S-box, we start with approach of how to partition the 240 binary vectors into four parts as follows.
Given 240 binary vectors B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 240. As can be seen in Table 1 , the probability of D Bi,Bj = 16 is equal to 0.0155%. Such a small probability means that: If D Bi,Bj = 16, there must be a very strong correlation between two binary vectors B i and B j . In other words, the binary vectors B i and B j should be very close to the same coordinate function of secret S-box in case of D Bi,Bj = 16. Therefore, we treat the binary vectors which hold D Bi,Bj = 16 as the priority vectors. Assuming that we construct r priority sets
According to the definition of priority sets, the higher value of |Ω k |, the more information about one coordinate function of secret S-box. Therefore, we start with the priority set which the value of |Ω k | is maximal. Let k i ∈ Ω k . We choose a vector B ki from the 240 binary vectors and mark B ki . Then we sort 240 binary vectors in descending order up to the value of S B k i ,Bj from j = 1 to j = 240. We check if the vector B j is marked for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 240. If B j is unmarked, We add B j into the first set Φ 1 until |Φ 1 | = 60. We stop repeating this method when we have identified four
Next, we propose the improved voting method of constructing the candidate coordinate functions of secret S-boxes based on these four sets Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 , Φ 4 . In [7] , Borghoff et al. proposed a majority voting method to get "true" vector from three longest vectors. It means that the weighting factor of each vector is considered equal. Compared to Borghoff's attack, our attack treats the similarity degree as the weighting factor in voting method as follows.
Let β = (β 0 , β 1 , · · · , β 15 ). For a given set Φ l , 1 ≤ l ≤ 4, for each 0 ≤ x ≤ 15 , we compute 15 ) into a binary vector which is denoted by V l , such that the eight highest value correspond to "0"-bits and the remaining correspond to "1"-bits. Our method of finding four candidate coordinate functions of secret S-boxes is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Finding four candidate coordinate functions of secret S-boxes

Require:
The 240 binary vectors Bi,
The value of t, ξ, τ ; Ensure:
Four candidate coordinate functions V1, V2, V3, V4 1: According to the value of t, ξ, τ , for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 240, we compute the similarity degrees for j = 1 to 240 do 8:
if Bj is unmarked then 9:
Add Bj into the set Φ l and n ← n + 1. 10: else if n ≤ 60 then 11:
Continue. 12: else 13:
Break. 14: end if 15: end for 16:
For each 0 ≤ x ≤ 15 , we compute However, in our experiment, the candidate vectors found by Algorithm 2 might not be complete the correct coordinate functions of secret S-box. In order to get all information about secret S-box, we propose a method of constructing all correct coordinate functions of secret S-box by using pruning search algorithm. The efficient filtering method in pruning search algorithm is presented as the following proposition.
m be a bijective mapping, and
r is balanced.
In [7] , the authors pointed out that the intersections of two correct sets (with different masks) contain exactly four values. our Proposition 1 extended the conclusion of their checking correctness. For every correct vectors
) is balanced. We call this filter the balance filter. In order to measure the effectiveness of balance filter, we present the probability of random vectors passing this filter.
Without loss of generality, let Such a small probability means the balance filter is a strong filter, and many wrong candidate coordinate functions may be found by this filter. The pruning search algorithm of constructing correct coordinate functions of secret S-boxes by using balance filter is described in Algorithm 3. In conclusion, our attack for recovering the correct coordinate functions of secret S-boxes can be described as following steps:
Step1. We get 240 original vectors
after encrypting enough plaintexts. For every β, we compute the relative distance
Step2. Since we have obtained 240 relative distance vectors (R
β , · · · , R (15) β ) in step 1, we transform these vectors into binary vectors B β .
Step3. In this step we find four candidate coordinate functions by using Algorithm 2 based on 240 binary vectors B β .
Algorithm 3 Constructing the sets of four candidate correct coordinate functions
Require:
Four candidate coordinate functions V1, V2, V3, V4 searched by Algorithm 2; The sets Θ The set Ψ of four correct candidate coordinate functions The Function F (Θ, j, V ) 1: j ← j + 1 2: for k is even, k = 2 to 16 do 3:
Check if the vectors U1, · · · , Uj pass the balance filter.
7:
if pass the balance filter then 8:
do Step4. We search all four correct candidate coordinate functions of secret S-boxes by using Algorithm 3.
After the steps above, though we get four correct sets V γi = {x| α i , S(x) = γ i }, γ i = 0, 1 , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 , we still do not know the value of α i , γ i . Therefore, we just recover the equivalent S-boxes of the secret S-boxes. In [7] , Borghoff et al. pointed out that the single-bit mask at the output of the S-box layer in the first round has a stronger correlation with the low-weight mask at the input of the S-box layer in the last round. It was reasonable to assume that α i was of weight one. According to this assumption, in order to determine the correct secret Sbox, we should consider 2 4 × 4! ≈ 2 8.6 possible equivalent S-boxes for each 4-bit S-box in the cipher Maya. Therefore, we need (2 8.6 ) 16 ≈ 2 137.6 time complexity to recover all 16 secret S-boxes by exhaustive search. It is so large that the complexity is infeasible. In this paper, we focus on the settings of PRESENTlike cipher where the S-boxes are key-dependent and are repeated for the first and last rounds. We present a method of determining all 16 secret S-boxes with lower time complexity.
Determining the Secret S-box
In this section, we propose a technique to determine the secret S-boxes from the equivalent ones. Let S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S N be secret S-boxes and S −1
N be the inverse of these S-boxes. Without the loss of generality, we explain how to determine the leftmost S-box S 1 . Assuming that we get m correct coordinate functions of secret S-box
are m-bit permutations and f 1 , g 1 are known functions based on U j and V j :
With the notations above, if we determine the value of k 1 , P 1 or t 1 , Q 1 , we can recover the secret S-box S 1 (or S −1 1 ) uniquely. We propose an efficient filtering method of determining the value of t 1 , P 1 , Q 1 as follows.
For every 0 ≤ x ≤ 2 m − 1 , it must hold that
then we have
and then
where f 1 , g 1 are known functions, t 1 is an unknown m-bit constant and P 1 , Q 1 are unknown m-bit permutation. In order to determine t 1 , P 1 , Q 1 , we guess t 1 , Q 1 by exhaustive search first. If the value of t 1 and Q 1 are correct, it must hold that P 1 is a m-bit permutation. By using this guess and determine method, the time complexity of determining one secret S-box can be reduced to 2
To the cipher Maya, the complexity to determine one correct S-box is equal to 2 4 × 4! ≈ 2 8.58 . In order to check the correctness of t 1 and Q 1 , we introduce two effective filters as following definition.
, where f 1 , g 1 are known functions, t 1 is an unknown m-bit constant and Q 1 , P 1 are unknown m-bit permutation. If the value of t 1 , Q 1 are correct, it holds that
we name this filter linear filter. Let wt(e i ) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ r , it holds that
we name this filter weight filter. 1 . In fact, the linear filter is equivalent to P being linear, and weight filter is equivalent to wt(P (e i )) = 1 with wt(e i ) = 1. In order to measure the effectiveness of linear filter and weight filter, we start with the necessary and sufficient condition of t 1 , Q 1 passing these two filters as following theorem.
Theorem 1.
Let P be an m-bit bijective mapping. The necessary and sufficient condition of P being a m-bit permutation is that P is linear and for every e i with wt(e i ) = 1, we have wt(P (e i )) = 1 .
According to theorem 1, the case of P being a m-bit permutation is equivalent to that of t 1 , Q 1 passing the linear filter and weight filter. For an m-bit bijective mapping P , the probability of P being a bit-wise permutation is equal to 4 
Experiments
In this section, we apply our attack on PRESENT-like cipher in practice and estimate the success rate and complexity. Our experiment is based on 200 independent trials. In our experiment, let τ = 1, ξ = 2, t = 10 (see Definition 1 and Algorithm 2).
In the sequel, we measure the data complexity in units which are equivalent to a known plaintext. The dominative time consumption of our attack is the time cost in the pruning search algorithm (Algorithm 3). Therefore, we measure the time complexity of our attack in units which are equivalent to an operation of checking if the vectors passing the balance filter.
In [7] , Borghoff et al. pointed out that they carried out the attack using 2 25 data complexity to 10 rounds Maya. However, the number of correct coordinate functions obtained and success rate were not presented in [7] . We did the same experiment as Borghoff et al. did on the 10 rounds Maya with 2 22 to 2 27 data complexity. Table 2 shows the success rate of finding at least one correct coordinate function of the secret S-box by using Algorithm 2 in this paper and using the method in [7] . Table 3 shows more details about the number of correct coordinate functions and the success rate by Borghoff's method. According to Table 2 , the success rate is higher in our improved slender-set linear attack. It means that we can get more information about the secret S-boxes than Borghoff's attack. As can be seen from Table 3 , more than two correct coordinate functions would be recovered by Borghoff's linear attack in very rare cases with 2 22 data complexity and even though with 2 27 data complexity. In order to recover a 4-bit secret S-box, it requires four linearly independent coordinate functions. It means that Borghoff's attack can not get enough information to recover the secret S-box.
However, after getting one or more correct coordinate functions, being different from Borghoff's attack, our attack can construct all four correct coordinate functions of secret S-box by using Algorithm 3. Assuming that we get one correct coordinate function of the secret S-box, the maximal time complexity of Algorithm 3 is equal to (C 3 ≈ 2 37.95 . Table 4 shows the time consumption of Algorithm 3 based on 1 to 3 correct coordinate functions. Our experiment is based on 200 independent trials. From Table 4 , we can find all four correct coordinate functions of secret S-box in less than a few minutes on a standard PC (at AMD Athlon 7750 Processor 2.7 GHz) after getting one or more correct coordinate functions. To 10 rounds Maya, we can recover all four correct coordinate functions of secret S-box with 2 24 data and 2 17.78 time complexity at success rate 94% (see Table 2 and Table  4 ). We apply our attack to 6 to 16 rounds Maya and estimate the data and time complexity and success rate (see Table 5 ). known plaintexts by using our attack.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an improved slender-set linear attack to PRESENTlike cipher with secret S-boxes. We present three improvements comparing with Borghoff's attack. First, we use a new technique to to support consistency of partitions of the input x to the secret S-boxes of the first S-box layer. Second, a new technique is proposed by making full use of the information from all the 240 original vectors together instead of the three longest vectors. Third, an effective filter for constructing correct coordinate functions of secret S-boxes by using pruning search algorithm is presented. These three techniques can help us to get the all four correct coordinate functions more efficiently. Finally, we focus on the settings where the secret S-boxes are key-dependent and are repeated for the first and last rounds. We propose a filter to determine the correct S-box from equivalent S-boxes with lower time complexity. We describe the practical attack to full round Maya, as detailed in Table 5 . The experiments show that the correct S-box can be recovered with 2 36 known plaintexts, 2 18.9 time complexity and negligible memory complexity at a success rate of 87.5%. Our attack is the improvement and sequel of Borghoff's work, which is the best linear attack on PRESENT-like cipher with secret S-boxes up to now.
An interesting open question is to find a more efficient method to recover the correct coordinate functions of secret S-boxes. In fact, the approximation by Eq.
(1) in section 3.2 could bring too much noise. Furthermore, the theoretical model for complexity of recovering coordinate functions would be a possible direction of future work.
